Earlier formal models of legislatures focused on the median voter as the pivotal decision maker, but Krehbiel incorporates two procedures that temper simple majority decision making: the president's right to veto legislation (which is subject to a two-thirds override vote by the legislature) and the right of unlimited debate in the Senate (which generally can only be overcome with a three-fifths cloture vote). The model includes a president and n legislators in a unicameral legislature, each with an ideal point along a unidimensional policy space and single-peaked preferences. Krehbiel develops a simple formal model that yields predictions consistent with these basic facts and accounts for variations in gridlock level and coalition size. Existing frameworks fail to account for two basic facts of lawmaking in America: Gridlock is common but not constant, and coalitions are regularly bipartisan and greater than simple majorities. lawmaking that incorporate both presidential and congressional decision making. Krehbiel begins with the observation that there is a shortage of good basic theories of U.S. By combining innovative yet accessible theorizing with rigorous empirical tests, Krehbiel has made a major contribution to the literatures on divided government, legislative-executive relations, and the policy process more generally. Nonetheless, Keith Krehbiel not only offers a powerful critique of this idea but also provides an alternative explanation for gridlock: the need for supermajority support in order to pass laws in the U.S. The conventional wisdom that divided government causes policy gridlock has proven difficult to dislodge.

Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Gridlock interval